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Repression, Resistance, 
and Resilience in Tibet
Michael C. Davis
The tragic March 2008 riots in Tibet surprised the Chinese 
government and the world both by their occurrence and 
intensity. Decades of harsh Chinese suppression of even the 
mildest forms of dissent left many citizens falsely assum-
ing that the situation in Tibet was under control and that 
Tibetans were satisfied with Chinese rule. The timing of 
the riots was inspired both by the March anniversary of the 
1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule when the Dalai 
Lama fled into exile and by the Beijing Olympics, which 
gave them the opportunity to attract attention to their cause. 
The ferocity of the demonstrations appeared to catch even 
the exiled Tibetan leadership off guard. Long committed 
to non-violence and mindful of putting Tibetans at risk 
of a harsh Chinese response, these leaders would not have 
encouraged such public confrontation. The Chinese have 
long claimed to have liberated Tibetans from feudal and 
repressive indigenous rule and to have brought about popu-
lar democratic reform—a claim now refuted by these pro-
tests, which demonstrated both the inadequacy of current 
Chinese policies and the resilience of the Tibetan identity.
The Tibetan cause has shown a surprising resilience 
through a prolonged series of crises over several decades. 
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The Sino-Tibetan narrative is a famil-
iar story of the occupation and resis-
tance of an indigenous people. The 
2007 United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that 
calls for guarantees of autonomy and 
self-rule, likewise acknowledges the 
difficulties and rights-deprivation that 
indigenous peoples experience around 
the world.1  The PRC voted for the 
UN Declaration and yet seems to have 
missed this point in its own back yard. 
The current resilience of the Tibetan 
cause is a product of this failed under-
standing and the harsh repression asso-
ciated with it. The three R’s in the 
title—repression, resistance and resil-
ience—reflect a causal chain, as indig-
enous communities subject to sustained 
periods of repression feel encouraged 
to resist, and that resistance in turn 
shapes their identity and resilience as a 
people.2  
The sections that follow address the 
explicit Chinese and Tibetan reactions 
to the 2008 crisis, the historical Sino-
Tibetan relationship, and recent Chi-
nese official policies on national ethnic 
autonomy. The article then concludes 
with a policy prescription that draws on 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. 
The 2008 Crisis and the 
Current Impasse. After the March 
2008 demonstrations in Tibet and var-
ious supportive demonstrations that 
followed the Olympic torch around the 
world, the Chinese government aggres-
sively condemned the Tibetan rioters 
and pressed foreign governments to 
contain overseas demonstrations. With 
Olympic success at stake, however, the 
PRC government was under consider-
able pressure to meet with Tibetan exile 
leaders. A quick meeting in Shenzhen 
was followed by two formally scheduled 
conferences with the Dalai Lama’s rep-
resentatives in July and October 2008. 
The latter two dates were considered the 
seventh and eighth rounds in a series 
of largely unproductive Sino-Tibetan 
meetings that began in 2002.3 While 
Beijing was interested solely in damage 
control, the Tibetans came to the table 
with a serious proposal for negotiation.
In response to a Chinese request at 
the July meeting that they outline their 
position on autonomy under the Chi-
nese constitution, the Tibetans pre-
pared and submitted at the October 
meeting a “Memorandum on Genuine 
Autonomy for the Tibetan People.”4  In 
this memorandum the Tibetans pro-
posed a hybrid of China’s two consti-
tutional models for regional autonomy: 
the PRC Constitution Article 4 model 
on minority nationality autonomy and 
the PRC Constitution Article 31 model 
on special administrative regions, as is 
applied to Hong Kong.5    
The Tibetan Memorandum offered 
this “middle way” approach as a nego-
tiating position.6 This approach favors 
“genuine autonomy” under Chinese 
rule and has long been advocated by the 
Dalai Lama as an intermediate posi-
tion between full independence and the 
current lack of autonomy. Even before 
the meetings, the Chinese reiterated 
their long-standing position that the 
“contacts and dialogues were about the 
Dalai Lama’s personal future, and not 
so-called ‘China-Tibet negotiation’” 
or “dialogue between Han and Tibetan 
people.”7 They went so far as to chal-
lenge the Dalai Lama’s credentials to 
represent the Tibetan people, insisting 
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that he must speak to the central gov-
ernment as a “common person.”8  
The Chinese position hardened in 
response to the Tibetan Memorandum, 
accusing the Tibetans in a State Coun-
cil Press Conference of seeking “half-
independence,” and “covert indepen-
dence.”9 They argued that Tibet has 
always been an inseparable part of Chi-
na and accused Tibetan exiles of various 
misdeeds, including proposals of “eth-
nic cleansing” in the Memorandum and 
activities such as colluding with “East-
ern Turkistan terrorists.” The State 
Council Address declared, “[w]e never 
discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue’ and 
will never make a concession.”10  In the 
face of Chinese rejection of the Tibet-
an Memorandum, a large November 
meeting of Tibetan exiles continued to 
support this “middle way” approach, 
even while suspending discussions.11
This uncompromising approach has 
made it clear that Chinese leaders have 
no interest in responding to Tibet-
an concerns about greater autonomy. 
The historical and continued repres-
sive policies and denial of a separate 
Tibetan identity has no doubt moved 
Tibetans to defend their distinctive 
character vigorously, more so than they 
would have without such subjugation, as 
was evident in the anger expressed dur-
ing the 2008 demonstrations and riots. 
The continued desire to defend their 
identity as Tibetans contributes to their 
resilience as a distinctive community 
with their own culture and traditions.  
The Historical Sino-Tibetan 
Relationship. While Chinese poli-
cies have acknowledged that Tibetans 
have a distinct nationality, they have 
pressed Tibetan leaders to accept the 
Chinese interpretation of the Sino-
Tibetan past that the Dalai Lama has 
explicitly rejected. The Sino-Tibetan 
dispute over interpreting their shared 
history continues to drive the cur-
rent policy debate over the legitimacy 
of Chinese rule and Tibetan claims 
for greater autonomy. The Chinese 
claim to have ruled Tibet indirectly 
during the dynastic period through a 
relationship in which the Tibetan gov-
ernment and its religious leaders were 
subordinate to the Chinese emperor. 
The Tibetans have seen themselves as 
independent—though at times as a vassal 
state—with the Dalai Lama in a patron-
priest relationship with the Chinese 
Emperor. Under either view, there was 
no direct Chinese rule until after the 
1950s occupation. Even the Seventeen-
Point Agreement, which the Chinese 
thrust upon the Dalai Lama after the 
1950 invasion, still called only for indi-
rect Chinese rule over an autonomous 
Tibet.12  
Chinese accounts usually date Chi-
na’s claimed incorporation of Tibet to 
the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1270-
1368). Tibet scholar Warren Smith 
describes a carefully crafted diplomatic 
The Sino-Tibetan Narrative is a familiar 
story of the occupation and resistance of an 
indigenous people.
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relationship between ruling Tibetan 
lamas and Chinese emperors from the 
Yuan Dynasty forward, in which Chi-
nese imperial attempts at subordina-
tion were matched with Tibetan resis-
tance.13  Tibet appeared to be at most a 
vassal state much like Korea on China’s 
northeast border.14 While the Yuan 
Emperors valued a patron-priest rela-
tionship with Tibetan lamas, the sub-
sequent Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644) appeared to value Tibetan lamas 
more for their intermediary role with 
the threatening Mongols. It was only in 
the middle of the Manchu-dominated 
Qing Dynasty (1636-1910) that impe-
rial China occasionally occupied and 
ruled Tibet, and even then the method 
appeared to be indirect rule as part of 
the Qing’s “exterior empire,” though 
the Eastern Tibetan provinces of Kham 
and Amdo were sometimes under direct 
Qing control.15  
After the Qing’s decline Tibet 
enjoyed de facto independence from 
1911 until its occupation by the PRC in 
1950. While the Chinese are fond of 
characterizing Tibet during this period 
as hopelessly feudal in order to justify 
its “liberation,” there is little evidence 
to show that it was any more feudal 
than China itself.16 The indigenous Ti-
betan government seems to have by then 
begun the process of modernization, 
which has since gained further traction 
with the establishment of democracy for 
the current government-in-exile.17  
China’s Current Ethnic Auton-
omy Policies. After its 1950 inva-
sion, China promised Tibet full auton-
omy with indigenous self-rule under the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement. However, 
in its post-revolutionary zeal, China 
freely interfered in Tibetan affairs. 
Tibetan anger at such encroachment 
eventually led to the 1959 uprising, the 
flight of the Dalai Lama, and the estab-
lishment of a government in exile. This 
government-in-exile has offered an 
independent Tibetan voice of resistance 
through the long years of authoritarian 
policies and strict Chinese control. 
This has no doubt contributed to the 
resilience of the Tibetan identity, which 
was further developed and encouraged 
by the many writings and efforts of the 
exile government. Repression reached 
its height during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. Though there was some 
remorse and liberalization after the 
Cultural Revolution, Tibetan demon-
strations in the late 1980s led to further 
crackdowns.
The same harsh Chinese policies of 
suspicion and distrust have persisted 
ever since, though in recent years Chi-
nese leaders have sought to temper 
their political control with economic 
development assistance. This is seem-
ingly done in the belief that Tibet-
an anger and resistance is driven by 
economic factors and not the strong 
sense of ethnic and religious identity 
expressed by Tibetan exiles. Tibetans 
resent these policies, based on their 
perception that much of this economic 
activity does not assist Tibetans, but 
instead aims to achieve Chinese security 
objectives and to benefit ethnic Chi-
nese who are encouraged to move to 
the region.18 Tibetans have meanwhile 
expressed quiet resistance in numerous 
ways, including sending their children 
to Tibetan schools run by the exile gov-
ernment in India. With the lack of free 
expression and association in Tibet, the 
leadership in exile, especially the Dalai 
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Lama, has long provided the coherent 
expression of Tibetan identity that sus-
tains the community today. 
China’s formal policies on Tibet are 
promulgated in articles on national 
regional autonomy in the 1982 PRC 
Constitution19 and in the Law on 
Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) 
passed in 1984, as revised in 2001.20 
The LRNA expressly provides protec-
tion for national minorities in the areas 
of language, education, political rep-
resentation, administrative appoint-
ments, local economic and financial 
policies, and the use of local natural 
resources. Still, Article 15 of the LRNA 
provides that autonomous areas carry 
out their role “under the unified lead-
ership of the State Council and shall be 
subordinate to it.” A basic regulation 
on the exercise of autonomy has never 
been enacted for the Tibet Autono-
mous Region, though other separate 
regulations that largely track national 
laws have. In practice, these national 
minority laws enhance central authority 
and address Chinese security concerns 
in respect to their two most restive 
minority regions, Tibet and Xinjiang. 
Central officials are generally appoint-
ed to important Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) positions, and a complex 
process of CCP review and approval of 
all local legislative initiatives assures very 
little local minority autonomy.21 When 
this brand of governance is accompa-
nied by the harsh security measures 
of China’s omnipresent Public Secu-
rity Bureau and the People’s Liberation 
Army, Tibetans may feel the urge to 
resist Chinese rule in any way they can.
The May 2004 Chinese White Paper 
on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet 
offers a Chinese rebuttal of such criti-
cisms, highlighting favorable statistics 
on Tibetan participation in autono-
mous governance, including a 93 per-
cent voter turnout rate for county level 
elections and over 80 percent Tibet-
an occupation of the top positions of 
various autonomous governments and 
standing committees.22 Critical reports, 
however, argue that Tibetans lack real 
power and are generally subordinate to 
more powerful Chinese officials.23 
The weakness of minority autonomy 
is evident in the exercise of administra-
tive power on both national and local 
levels. Pragmatically, the top official in 
the TAR will nearly always represent the 
interest of the Central Government. 
This leads Tibetans to see themselves as 
a subordinate class, further encourag-
ing the repressive siege mentality that 
may sustain their cause. Furthermore, 
there is no sign of the indigenous 
form of self-rule promised in the Sev-
enteen-Point Agreement—promises of 
autonomy under indigenous systems of 
governance were clearly envisioned as 
Resistance is difficult when nearly all 
avenues to defiance have been closed by strict 
control of expression and aggressive policies 
of reeducation.
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temporary. A 1997 report of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists sup-
ports this argument, noting that while 
“Tibetans are in positions of nominal 
authority, they are often shadowed by 
more powerful Chinese officials” and 
“every local organ is shadowed by a CCP 
committee or ‘leading group.’”24
  Added to these structural and ideo-
logical impediments has been a long his-
tory of repressive acts. Chinese repres-
sion has included military occupation 
and crack-downs, the sacking and 
razing of Buddhist monasteries dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, coerced 
“reeducation” of monks and nuns in 
monasteries, large-scale imprisonment 
of dissidents, compulsory renuncia-
tion of the Dalai Lama, and the forced 
relocation of rural dwellers and herd-
ers to more populated areas. Tibetan 
resentment is expressed in public, but 
more often muted, ways such as send-
ing their children to India for edu-
cation, or declining to wear Tibetan 
ceremonial clothes when asked by Chi-
nese officials. Resistance is difficult 
when nearly all avenues to defiance have 
been closed by strict control of expres-
sion and aggressive policies of reeduca-
tion. Such heavy-handed tactics and 
the consequent urge to resist appear to 
encourage Tibetan loyalty to the Dalai 
Lama and China’s demands for his 
renunciation. Tibetan resentment has 
bubbled over into mass demonstrations 
in 1959, 1989, and 2008. An argument 
grounded in Tibet’s rich sense of his-
tory, and sustained in the Dalai Lama’s 
guardianship of Tibet’s religious and 
cultural traditions, demonstrates that 
repression breeds determined resis-
tance, which in turn breeds a deeper 
sense of identity and resilience.  
Beyond Repression and 
Resistance. The unrelenting Chi-
nese political control over Tibet has 
encouraged Tibetan resistance. The 
few changes the Chinese government 
has made have too often fallen short 
of what had been promised, and have 
failed to meet international standards. 
Soon after the 2007 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
was passed, China declared that there 
are no indigenous peoples in China,25 
claiming that “for 5,000 years the Chi-
nese were always united with minorities 
living on their own lands.”26 The 2008 
demonstrations in Tibet call into ques-
tion this image of ethnic satisfaction 
and harmony. The immediate harsh 
Chinese crackdown followed by ex-
pressions of Chinese indifference in 
the late-2008 discussions did little to 
repair Tibetan alienation and despair.
If China and the world would like 
to see this situation improve there are 
clear avenues to consider. First, the 
political leadership in China should 
acknowledge that their current policies 
of excessive control have only bred the 
kinds of sustained resistance and doubts 
about Chinese rule they have sought to 
dispel. The Chinese government has 
long feared that Tibetans simply want to 
split the country. They claim to prefer 
what they characterize as a harmonious 
society, effectively denying the Tibetan 
identity. To achieve this society, the 
Chinese need to return autonomous 
control to the Tibetan community.
Second, they need to admit that 
the genuine autonomy proposed by 
the Tibetan Memorandum is consistent 
with both China’s domestic constitu-
tional framework and its international 
obligations. The agreement between 
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the constitution’s and Seventeen-Point 
Agreement’s recognition of a special 
obligation to indigenous groups has 
been widely acknowledged as the impe-
tus behind the “one country, two sys-
tems” model applied to Hong Kong 
under PRC Constitution Article 31. By 
voting for the UN Declaration, which 
offers similar commitments to indig-
enous peoples worldwide, China dem-
onstrated a capacity to appreciate this 
point. The Memorandum was offered 
as a negotiating platform and should 
be taken as such. It reflects a Tibetan 
willingness to compromise from the 
independence they might otherwise be 
entitled to seek.27
 Third, the Chinese Government 
should take advantage of the Dalai Lama 
as a negotiating partner. Speculation 
often has it that the Chinese govern-
ment is playing for time, hoping that 
the Tibetan cause will die with the 
Dalai Lama. With his death, however, 
this superb and reasonable negotiat-
ing partner will be lost. Beyond the 
equanimity of his autonomy proposals, 
Chinese officials should be mindful of 
his superior capacity to deliver on his 
promises. There is no reason to fear 
the slippery slopes often raised by Chi-
nese officials—that Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
may seek a similar deal or that Tibetans 
may use this as the first step to inde-
pendence. Such an arrangement may 
offer a very positive model for resolving 
the tensions in Xinjiang by allowing 
the Uyghurs control over their own 
situation within a currently prosper-
ous China. Moreover, large numbers 
of Tibetans have consistently supported 
the Dalai Lama’s “middle way” approach 
and would likely support any agreement 
he proffered. The recent Tibetan elec-
tion of the youthful 42-year-old Lob-
sang Sangay as the new prime minister 
of the exile government, along with the 
Dalai Lama’s indications of a desire to 
withdraw from his historical political 
role, promises not only sustained lead-
ership in the exile government, but also 
signals that the window of opportunity 
to deal directly with the Dalai Lama will 
someday close.28
Fourth, international partners 
should use their offices to encourage 
Chinese officials to embrace the Tibet-
an Memorandum as a negotiating doc-
ument. China has talked with Tibetan 
representatives about this issue, but to 
little purpose, proving that it is not 
enough to encourage discussions. The 
Memorandum, in conjunction with the 
various documents discussed under the 
second point above, offers a more con-
crete framework for productive discus-
sion and should specifically be pro-
moted in foreign policy.
Finally, China’s relationship with 
Tibet should be built on cooperation 
and respect instead of repression and 
control. Chinese leaders, who have 
Such generosity in spirit and substance 
will ultimately prove the measure of China’s 
Tibet policies, both for Tibetans and the 
world.
DAVIS  Resilience
  Summer/Fall 2011 [37]
REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND RESILIENCE IN TIBET
long promoted Tibetan culture to tour-
ists, should respect Tibetan traditions 
instead of demeaning them as backward 
and feudal. At the same time, China’s 
growing economic capacities should be 
shared. Such generosity in spirit and 
substance will ultimately prove the mea-
sure of China’s Tibet policies, both for 
Tibetans and for the world.
These policy prescriptions are ulti-
mately interconnected. It should be 
remembered that China’s policies on 
the indigenous Tibetan people do not 
exist in isolation from China’s other 
foreign policy concerns. The Nobel 
Laureate Dalai Lama has long been 
ranked as one of the most popular 
political figures in the world. As the 
fourth item above suggests, even while 
formally recognizing the PRC, lead-
ing foreign nations have long been 
uncomfortable with China’s repressive 
Tibet policies. With its recent rise, 
China’s approach to ruling a peripheral 
community has become an even more 
personal concern for foreign leaders. 
If China achieves a dominant position 
in global affairs, as is widely predicted, 
how can we expect it to treat other 
peoples around the world? In this sense 
Tibet has become a barometer of what 
might be expected from PRC domi-
nance. A policy built on cooperation 
and respect in Tibet would not only 
benefit the Tibetan people, but would 
surely send the right signal to the world 
at large.
1 United Nations, “UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples,” Internet, http://www.tebteb-
ba.org/tebtebba_files/ipr/undrip/OfficialResolution/
A61L.67%20eng.pdf (date accessed: 4 April 2011).
2 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
3 Over the decades there have been other Sino-
Tibetan meetings, but the round of meetings begin-
ning in 2002 have been the most sustained. While the 
Tibetans, as advocated again in their 2008 memo-
randum, aimed to reach a settlement that guaranteed 
genuine autonomy under what they characterize as 
the “middle way” approach, the Chinese have gener-
ally declared that they are only interested in discussing 
the status of the Dalai Lama, as again articulated in 
response to the Memorandum.
4 Tibet Autonomous Region, “Memorandum on 
Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Seventh 
Sino-Tibetan Meeting, 4 November 2008.
5 The critical language in PRC Constitution, 
Article 4 provides: “Regional autonomy is practiced 
in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
compact communities; in these areas organs of self- 
government are established for the exercise of the right 
of autonomy.” PRC Constitution, Article 31 provides: 
“The state may establish special administrative regions 
when necessary. The systems to be instituted in spe-
cial administrative regions shall be prescribed by law 
enacted by the National People’s Congress in light of 
the specific conditions.”
6 Tracking the areas of autonomy typical of indig-
enous people’s rights listed in the UN Indigenous 
Peoples’ Declaration, the Tibetan Memorandum 
sought autonomy in eleven policy areas, including 
language, culture, religion, education, environmental 
protection, utilization of natural resources, economic 
development and trade, public health, public security, 
population migration, and cultural, educational, and 
religious exchanges with other countries. All of these 
except for the requested guarantees relating to local 
control over public security, migration, and external 
exchanges reflect unfulfilled commitments to ethnic 
minority autonomy already promised by the Chinese 
under Article 4. As with Hong Kong, the Tibetan 
side further asked that local autonomous laws not be 
subject to Central Government approval and that the 
Central Government not be allowed to amend the 
arrangement unilaterally. They added a controversial 
request that the current thirteen contiguous Tibetan 
autonomous areas be unified into one as a geo-
graphical matter. Beyond the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region (TAR), there are presently twelve contiguous 
Tibetan autonomous areas in adjoining provinces. 
China has long objected, since such a unified Tibetan 
area would constitute one quarter of contemporary 
China. While China’s existing national autonomy 
laws seem to promise that identified minorities living 
in a contiguous area will enjoy a single autonomous 
region for local self-rule, they have refused this for 
Tibetans. Tibetans argue that since they are only seek-
NOTES
[38]   Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 
request that the current thirteen contiguous Tibetan 
autonomous areas be unified into one as a geo-
graphical matter. Beyond the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region (TAR), there are presently twelve contiguous 
Tibetan autonomous areas in adjoining provinces. 
China has long objected, since such a unified Tibetan 
area would constitute one quarter of contemporary 
China. While China’s existing national autonomy 
laws seem to promise that identified minorities living 
in a contiguous area will enjoy a single autonomous 
region for local self-rule, they have refused this for 
Tibetans. Tibetans argue that since they are only seek-
ing autonomy there is no reason their areas cannot be 
united, while China seems to fear such unity will pose 
temptations toward greater national disunity.
7 “Chinese official urges Dalai Lama to respond 
with sincerity after recent contact,” Xinhua, 6 July 
2008.
8 “Expert calls for dialogue on Tibet within Chi-
na’s constitutional framework,” Xinhua, 18 July 2006. 
This view was further supported by Dong Yunhu, the 
Director General of the State Council Information 
Office, who stated, “The Central Government will 
never discuss the future of Tibet with the Dalai Lama,” 
as “he has lost all right to negotiate on the future 
of Tibet.” - “China unwilling to broach Tibet with 
Dalai,” Indo-Asian News Service, 15 July 2008.
9 Zhu Weiqun, “Address at the Press Conference” 
(State Council Office, Beijing, 10 November 2008). 
10 Xinhua, “Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation 
Day,’” Internet, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/chi-
na/2009-01/19/content_7410293.htm (date accessed: 
19 January 2009,).
11 “China’s Communist Regime Losing Ground,” 
Agencies, 16 January 2008.
12 “Agreement of the Central People’s Govern-
ment and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures 
for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” Internet, http://
www. ti-bet.net/en/diir/pubs/phri/17point/data/app1.
html (date accessed: 4 April 2011). The Seventeen-
Point Agreement was essentially an agreement pre-
sented to the Dalai Lama on a “take it or leave it” basis 
after the Chinese invasion of Tibet. It promised Tibet 
autonomy under Chinese rule with the right to main-
tain the traditional form of government 
13 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A His-
tory of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1996), 83-100.
14 Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and 
Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (University of California, 
1999), 327-336. 
15 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A His-
tory of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1996), 134-138, 145, 151.
16 Robert Barnett, Authenticating Tibet, Answers to China’s 
100 Questions, Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buf-
fetrille, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2008) 81-84.
17 Lobsang Sangay, “Tibet: Exiles Journey,” Journal 
of Democracy 14, No. 3, (2003):119-130.
18 Warren W. Smith, “China’s Policy on Tibetan 
Autonomy,” East-West Center Washington Working Papers, No. 
2 (October 2004); Andrew M. Fisher, Authenticating 
Tibet, Anne-Marie Blondeau and Ka-tia Buffetrille, 
eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 
269.
19 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 
89 and 112-122.
20 Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Regional National Autonomy, 1984, revised 2001.
21 See Chunli Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power 
in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People’s Re-
public of China: The Law and the Reality,” presented 
in Conference on “One Country, Two Systems, Three 
Legal Orders—Perspectives on Evolution,” Macau, 
February 2007 (citing Organic Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, Article 7 and the Legislative Law, 
Article 63).
22 Office of the State Council of the PRC,White 
Paper on “Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, (Beijing, May 
2004).
23 Minority Rights Group International, “Human 
Rights in China and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national, China: Exclusion, Marginalization and Ris-
ing Tension” Internet, http://hrichina.org/public/
PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.Report.pdf (date accessed: 
4 April 2011).
24 Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, (Geneva: 
International Commission of Jurists, 1997), 14-21.
25 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 
in Switzerland, “China Concerned with Protection 
of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Internet, http://
ch.China-embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm 
(date accessed: 4 April 2011).
26 Tong Zhihwa, (speeches, Human Rights Coun-
cil, 1st Meeting, 11th Drafting Session).. 
27 Advisory Opinion, Accordance With International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Inter-
national Court of Justice, 22 July 2010; Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 
UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 UN Gaor, Supp. 
(No. 16), UN Doc. A/4684 (1960), 66.
  The exile government, its Kolan Tripa or prime 
minister and cabinet have long served in a subordinate 
role under the Dalai Lama, with whom China general-
ly deals directly, but the Dalai Lama’s expressed desire 
to relinquish his political role will no doubt produce 
changes in this formula when eventually accepted by 
the exile community. While the Chinese government 
will likely maintain the fiction that they are dealing 
only with the Dalai Lama, his stated intentions and 
the emergence of new exile leadership surely signal a 
coming diminution of the Dalai Lama’s role. “Lob-
sang Sangay elected Tibetan exile leader,” BBC, 27 
April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-13205481.
DAVIS  Resilience
